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This paper examines the temporal concepts that underlie the theory of trans-
ference in psychoanalysis. The paper reviews Freud’s rejection of linear tem-
porality as characteristic of unconscious thought in favour of regression,
repetition, and deferred action. It then develops concepts drawn from Jacques
Lacan’s theory of the formation of the ego. Here, the biologically determined
helplessness derived from the human prematurity of birth becomes trans-
formed into an ego that anticipates subjective unity. The paper then moves on
to the more complex theory of the temporality implied in subject formation,
offered in Lacan’s later theory of separation. Implications are drawn for the
use and understanding of transference in the practice of psychoanalysis via
clinical examples. In addition, Lacan’s ideas on subject formation are proposed
as an extension and clarification of previous psychoanalytic theories of devel-
opment.
INTRODUCTION
Lacan’s contribution to the theory of transference is typically dis-
cussed in relation to two observations. If we take as an example the
study by R. Horacio Etchegoyen, The Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic
Technique (1991), two chapters are devoted to Lacan’s contribution.
The first is derived from his paper ‘Intervention sur le transfert’
(Lacan, 1966[1951]), in which transference is considered to be an imag-
inary impasse, reflecting the analyst’s own resistance to the dialectical
unfolding of analysis and whereby the analyst, at every turn of this
dialectic, is required to reveal the truth of the analysand’s discourse.
The second chapter that Etchegoyen devotes to Lacan considers his
contribution from Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-
Analysis (Lacan, 1977[1964]). Here, transference is an artifice of the
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supposé-savoir. The analysand supposes that the analyst in some sense
knows, but the nature of the supposition provides the means to reveal
a mode of deception by which the subject evades the cause of their
desire.
No doubt there are more sympathetic receptions of Lacan’s contri-
bution. Both theories have attracted more subtle and comprehensive
readings in works by Michel Silvestre (1993), Moustapha Safouan
(1988) and Colette Soler (1996, 2002), to name but a few. However,
what has attracted less attention is a temporal theory of how transfer-
ence operates in the practice of psychoanalysis, which is a contribution
of at least equal importance to those discussed by Etchegoyen.
Although it is difficult to conceptualize, a consideration of temporal-
ity brings us much closer to the daily practicalities of analytic work.
The interventions used by an analyst cannot be based in an objectified
account of time, but must be based in a clear understanding of the
manner in which the subject of the unconscious, and, by implication,
the subject at play in the transference, operates according to its own
specific temporality. Based largely in a reading of Lacan’s text
‘Position of the unconscious’ (1995[1964]), this paper will articulate
these temporal concepts and, more specifically, show how the opera-
tion of transference in the clinical practice of psychoanalysis can be
derived from the temporality implied in Lacan’s account of the causa-
tion of the subject, which I will refer to simply as subject formation. I
will begin with a clinical example to illustrate the main themes to be
developed in this paper.
ACCOUNTING FOR LOST TIME
This analysand found himself to be one of the most interesting people
he had ever met. Indeed, he was devoted to doing everything inter-
esting: acquiring lists of credentials along with numerous testimonials
to his achievements. A significant proportion of his analysis was con-
sumed with their lengthy and detailed description. At a certain point
it was necessary to punctuate the sessions so as to force his hand, and
this led to his practice of accounting for lost time. The punctuation of
sessions was perceived to be a disruption, a cut, and finally a depri-
vation. After a series of sessions shortened in this manner he begins:
‘Now . . . you owe me some time’. The analysand had meticulously
added up the amount of time he considered to be lost. But the loss was
not irrecuperable since it was now what I owed him. It was not sur-
prising that he could give exacting details of this debt of time, which
I had unwittingly accrued. While being well aware of the practice 












































196 ANDREW J. LEWIS
enthusiasm, the reality of these specific punctuations induced a turn-
ing point in his analysis. He concluded by transforming his sense of
being robbed into a supposition within the transference: ‘Is it because
I’m so boring that you want to get rid of me?’
This question was familiar without ever having been spoken. Prior
to this moment, instead of posing the question to the person from
whom it had originated, he came to realize that he had been perform-
ing to an audience which, after having acknowledged the proper
addressee of this particular utterance, could be seen to be missing the
member for whom his performances really counted. The analysis of
this moment in the transference showed that he was repeating an
exchange between himself and his mother. What was even more strik-
ing was that the statement that he bored his mother had never actu-
ally been made, but instead he had always perceived it to be implied
in their interactions. So it became possible to unravel the transference,
which revealed the interpersonal strategy he adopted to be based in
his interpretation of the Other’s desire.
This clinical example illustrates that a significant turn in the treat-
ment occurred with reference to the punctuation of the sessions. To
understand this event and, more generally, the manner in which trans-
ference operates in analysis, it is necessary to draw upon a psychoan-
alytic theory of temporality. This particular analysand considered that
the time spent in sessions was his possession of which he was being
deprived and thus time was objectified. This case is reminiscent of
Lacan’s original remarks regarding what he tentatively referred to as
his ‘experiments’ with logical time, which included the comment that
using this technique he was able to produce ‘in a certain male subject
fantasies of anal pregnancy, as well as a dream of its resolution by
Cesarean section’ (Lacan, 2002b[1953], p. 98). In fact, it is obvious that
in this moment of his analysis, this analysand similarly considers that
his analyst regards him as a ‘boring shit’, to be unceremoniously dis-
carded from the sessions without warning. But what is of the utmost
importance is that this transferential meaning that is attributed to the
analyst’s desire can be analysed; that is, the history through which this
subject takes that particular position in relation to the Other can be
shown through his experience of transference.
FREUDIAN TIME
In psychoanalysis, when we speak of time we are not referring to 
an external measure, the time of clocks and calendars, but some-
thing intrinsic to the psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious
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transference it is necessary to understand first the temporal dimension
of the formation of the subject. Such a theory is imbedded in Freud’s
work, although one can be led astray by Freud’s rejection of the the-
ory of time as a linear sequence that reflects only the conscious–per-
ceptual apparatus’s access to the presentation of events in the external
world. Freud repeatedly stated that the unconscious is timeless, and as
early as Draft M, written in 1897, he stated that the unconscious
ignores the chronological connections of the material it uses when
forming fantasies (Freud, 1897, p. 252). Freud considered that the lin-
ear time of our conscious relation to the external world, in which
events are ordered chronologically, had no relevance to the logic of
displacement and condensation by which the unconscious orders its
material. In the most explicit discussion from his paper ‘The uncon-
scious’, he writes:
Further, it devolves upon the system Pcs. to make communication possible
between the different ideational contents so that they can influence one
another, to give them an order in time, and to set up a censorship or sev-
eral censorships; ‘reality-testing’ too, and the reality-principle, are in its
province. Conscious memory, moreover, seems to depend wholly on the
Pcs. (Freud, 1915e, p. 188)
While objective time belongs to the Preconscious/Conscious system
and, curiously, so too the memory of the past, elsewhere Freud’s
account of the phenomenon of transference implies a set of temporal
concepts.
Freud’s account of transference requires the concepts of history, rep-
etition, and regression, all of which have a temporal, although non-lin-
ear, dimension and are essentially derivatives of the drive theory. In a
passage added to ‘The interpretation of dreams’ in 1914, Freud writes:
Three kinds of regression are thus to be distinguished; a. topographical
regression, in the sense of the schematic picture [of the psychical appara-
tus]; b. temporal regression, in so far as what is in question is a harking back
to older psychical structures; and c. formal regression, where primitive
methods of expression and representation take the place of the usual ones.
All these three kinds of regression are, however, one at bottom and occur
together as a rule; for what is older in time is more primitive in form and
in psychical topography lies nearer to the perceptual end. (Freud, 1900a, 
p. 548.)
Regression requires what Laplanche and Pontalis call ‘a genetic suc-
cession’ of ‘the subject’s reversion to past phases of his development’












































198 ANDREW J. LEWIS
assumes that the various stages of infantile psycho-sexual develop-
ment follow each other in a predetermined order. Freud’s view on this
matter was not firmly established by the time of writing his ‘Three
essays on the theory of sexuality’ (Freud, 1905d), but constitutes a
position he arrives at around 1910–1912, probably in conjunction with
Ferenczi’s work on stages of reality and Abraham’s initial studies of
oral libido. Without pausing here to elaborate these historical details,
it suffices to say that the deception of a neat unfolding of ‘genetic
development’ bears much of the responsibility for directing psycho-
analytic theories of development down a scientifically lonesome blind
alley.
ANTICIPATION AND RETROACTIVITY
Jacques Lacan provides an explicit reconsideration of the temporality
of the unconscious. In 1949, Lacan introduces the notion of logical time
based on a sophism that has become known as the prisoners’ dilemma
(Lacan, 1988[1945]). These first forays into a new analytic time follow
directly from Lacan’s thesis regarding symbolic structures. Retro-
activity is an effect of the dominance of synchrony over diachrony, to
which Lacan subscribes as a result of the structuralism inherent in his
theory of symbolic systems, largely borrowed from Lévi-Strauss. In
this paper on logical time, the subject’s self-recognition is given by and
through a set of calculated interchanges with the Other, in a manner
which is reminiscent of game strategies and clearly influenced by
cybernetics. In the initial temporal theories from the 1940s and early
1950s, time is a series of intersubjective rules or, as in the analysis of
the purloined letter (Lacan, 1972[1956]), the intersubjective configura-
tion is externally imposed into the situation. This assumes that tem-
porality is situated in the intersubjective codes that govern interactions
between predetermined subjects, constituting the parameters of their
actions and interactions, giving rise to structural effects that are cer-
tainly ‘trans-individual’ but ultimately presuppose the status of the
subject. Although these early ideas are important, they fail to demon-
strate how temporality is inherent in what Paul Verhaeghe (2004) has
recently referred to as the subject’s formation.
Beyond these preliminary accounts of temporality, the first major
contribution to the role of temporality in the formation of the subject
must be discussed in terms of the mirror stage and more specifically
Lacan’s notion that the human neonate is born biologically premature.
Although this is a widely known aspect of Lacan’s theory, it is not fre-
quently acknowledged that in ‘Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety’
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[I]ntra-uterine existence seems to be short in comparison with that of most
animals, and it is sent into the world in a less finished state. As a result, the
influence of the real external world upon it is intensified and an early dif-
ferentiation between the ego and the id is promoted. Moreover, the dangers
of the external world have a greater importance for it, so that the value of
the object which can alone protect it against them and take the place of its
former intra-uterine life is enormously enhanced. The biological factor,
then, establishes the earliest situations of danger and creates the need to be
loved which will accompany the child through the rest of its life. (Freud,
1926d[1925], pp. 154–155)
Later, the idea that the neonate is premature and thus especially vul-
nerable to both injury or predation if left unattended becomes a central
tenet for John Bowlby in proposing that human attachment is an
innate species adaptation which has evolved through directional selec-
tion during evolutionary history (Bowlby, 1982[1969]; see also
Simpson, 1999, p. 116).
Lacan’s ideas are not incompatible with Bowlby’s but the emphasis
is more on prematurity as predisposing the subject to anticipate. A
fuller account is given in ‘Some reflections on the ego’:
Here physiology gives us a clue. The human animal can be regarded as one
which is prematurely born. The fact that the pyramidal tracts are not myeli-
nated at birth is proof enough of this for the histologist, while a number of
postural reactions and reflexes satisfy the neurologist. The embryologist too
sees in the ‘foetalization’, to use Bolk’s term, of the human nervous system,
the mechanism responsible for Man’s superiority to other animals – viz. the
cephalic flexures and the expansion of the fore-brain. His lack of sensory
and motor co-ordination does not prevent the new-born baby from being
fascinated by the human face, almost as soon as he opens his eyes to the
light of day, nor from showing in the clearest possible way that from all the
people around him he singles out his mother. (Lacan, 1953[1951], p. 15)
These comments foreshadow the findings of numerous develop-
mental studies that have repeatedly confirmed and expanded both the
physiological and neurological prematurity of the infant. Lacan’s use
of Bolk (1960[1926]) is now somewhat outdated (see Gould, 1977) but
the general principle of the biological prematurity of the neonate still
holds. More importantly for our argument, the capacity for imitation
of facial gestures (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977) and to discern and dif-
ferentiate the mother’s face, voice, and smell (Anderson, 1983) indicate
a foundational subject–other dialectic.
Lacan’s argument concerning the special significance of the mirror
stage is derived from the species-specific disjuncture between the ‘spe-












































200 ANDREW J. LEWIS
infant’s imitative self-recognition. This results in an early disposition
towards the image of both self and other and is fundamental in the for-
mation of the Ego. However, what appears uniquely in Lacan’s
account is that subject formation at the level of the assumption of an
image is bound up with what he calls a ‘temporal dialectic’, whereby
he adds that such a dialectic ‘projects the formation of the individual
into history’ (ibid., p. 6). In this comment one might be tempted to hear
the resonance of the Kleinian emphasis on projection. However, this
seems to me to be largely consistent with the strong phenomenologi-
cal basis of this argument, since the idea that Dasein is projected into
its future is central to Heidegger’s discussion in Being and Time
(Heidegger, 1962[1927]). This influence is even clearer in Lacan’s early
attempt to elaborate the temporality of anticipation in the theory of the
imaginary formation of the ego as an anticipated image of unity that
the subject seeks to counter the fragmented experience of its body.
Consider Lacan’s analysis in the 1953 text ‘The neurotic’s individual
myth’:
[T]he subject always has an anticipatory relationship to his own realization
which in turn throws him back onto the level of a profound insufficiency
and betokens a rift in him, a primal sundering, a thrownness, to use the
Heideggerian term. It is in this sense that what is revealed in all imaginary
relationships is an experience of death: an experience doubtless inherent in
all manifestations of the human condition, but especially visible in the life
of the neurotic. (Lacan, 1979[1953], pp. 422–423)
Thus, the human infant is thrown forward into existence, at which
point he or she already has a history. In a comment that shows that the
mirror stage is more than a developmental stage in a genetic order,
Lacan notes that this moment precipitates a sublation of biological
‘insufficiency to anticipation’. There is never a pure moment of ‘psy-
chological birth’, but a temporal split between coming into being and
always already having a history. Unlike for Bowlby, insufficiency is
never resolved with adequate maternal care, but is raised on to a sym-
bolic level where a subject’s desire is experienced as a lifetime of antic-
ipation. Although at this point Lacan’s comments refer to the
identifications in which the early ego is formed, the alienation inher-
ent in any process of identification means that the only being a subject
has is always anticipated in the future.
While the imaginary functions through futural anticipation, a sec-
ond aspect of temporality, that of retroactivity derived from the sym-
bolic operation of language, shows that the reality of the past is












































CONCEPTS OF TEMPORALITY IN THE THEORY OF TRANSFERENCE 201
with any simplistic view that psychoanalysis is concerned with an
unproblematic past of the subject. One finds an early example when
Lacan comes to the rescue of Melanie Klein, making exactly this point
in ‘Some reflections on the ego’:
What relation does the ‘libidinal subject’ whose relationships to reality are
in the form of an opposition between Innenwelt and an Umwelt have to the
ego? To discover this, we must start from the fact – all too neglected – that
verbal communication is the instrument of psycho-analysis. Freud did 
not forget this when he insisted that repressed material such as memories
and ideas which, by definition, can return from repression, must, at the 
time when the events in question took place, have existed in a form in 
which there was at least the possibility of its being verbalised. By dint 
of recognizing a little more clearly the supra-individual function of lan-
guage, we can distinguish in reality the new developments which are actu-
alised by language. Language has, if you care to put it like that, a sort of
retrospective effect in determining what is ultimately decided to be real.
Once this is understood, some of the criticisms which have been brought
against the legitimacy of Melanie Klein’s encroachments into the pre-verbal
areas of the unconscious will be seen to fall to the ground. (Lacan,
1953[1951], p. 11)
This intervention could have been quite decisive in the controversial
debates between Melanie Klein and her critics, such as Anna Freud
and Edward Glover, whereby both parties debated the possibility of
discrete phenomena and, most especially, unconscious phantasies that
are non-verbal and non-visual representations of object relations
derived from primitive bodily experiences occurring in the first
months of life (King and Steiner, 1991). With Lacan’s renewal of the
question of the subject and temporality, the status of any infantile
event and its remembering is over-determined by the synchronic orga-
nization of language. The apparent historical reality of development is
replaced in Lacan’s thinking by the retroactive effect of meaning that,
without denying that there is a reality to actual developmental events,
determines whatever interpretation of these events comes to be taken
up by a subject as their specific history.
HISTORICITY AND THE FUTURE ANTERIOR
As Lacan begins to turn towards the historicity of the subject, his the-
ory moves closer to a consideration of time as inherent in the defini-
tion of the subject. The third section of Lacan’s ‘Rome discourse’ is
entitled ‘The resonances of interpretation and the time of the subject












































202 ANDREW J. LEWIS
What is realized in my history is neither the past definite as what was, since
it is no more, nor even the perfect [le parfait] as what has been in what I am,
but the future anterior as what I will have been, given what what I am in
the process of becoming. (Lacan, 2002b[1953], p. 84)
The grammatical structure of language is determinative of the possi-
bilities of apprehending the subject, but what in English we call tense
of verbs gives rise to several different ways of understanding the past.
By favouring the future anterior tense, Lacan captures the effect of the
unconscious as it creates the subject retroactively. Psychoanalysis can
be considered such a process of becoming. The future anterior is a time
that splits the subject, becoming in the future what can at that point 
be seen as one’s past and thus what one is at any one time is never
complete.
As a grammatical and thus symbolic form, Lacan’s future anterior
refers more specifically to the subject of the unconscious as always
futurally disposed, forever open to a future contingency which may
retroactively re-transcribe the past. When Lacan comments that
‘Analysis can have as its goal only the advent of true speech and the
subject’s realization of his history in its relation to a future’ (ibid., 
p. 86), he is describing a subject of the unconscious that requires both
retroactivity and futural anticipation as the temporal modes of its his-
toricity. The realization of a division between these two temporal
modes is impossible to prescribe, since by saying that a subject is
formed with a futural disposition it already implies that there was some-
thing lacking in its history. The realization of this division will always
be the goal of the psychoanalytic experience for Lacan. It follows,
therefore, that the subject in psychoanalysis never has a pure ‘event-
hood’; there is never a simple advent or revelation of the subject.
Rather, the subject is within a rhythm of closure and opening. The sim-
ple difference is that an analysand chooses to speak into this void
while an analyst will take up the position of listening to the reverber-
ations of this void in the speech of the analysand.
The more radical consequences of the division of temporality can be
developed in order to link the closure of the unconscious in the
moment of transference. Such a moment of closure in analytic practice
gives rise to transference as a repetition and, as we saw in the clinical
example, the analysis is provided with a demonstration of the means
by which division for that subject is occluded. The opening of the
unconscious in analysis arises with the production of an enunciation –
‘Is it because I am so boring . . .’ – which opens itself to a futural deter-
mination while, at the same time, retroactively giving meaning to a pre-
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THE TEMPORALITY OF SEPARATION
Logical time is neither an objective logic that a subject obeys nor a
logic that a subject employs, but a logic required to account for the
concept of the subject in its relation to the Other (Lacan, 1988[1945]).
Lacan tends to favour a topologically based theory of this relationship
that responds to the emergence of new aspects of this dialectic. From
the period in which ‘Position of the unconscious’ was composed, the
relationship of the subject and Other moves from the previous inter-
subjective and thus reciprocal logic to a revised account of the ultimate
non-reciprocity between subject and Other through the processes of
alienation and separation. In a sense, the theory of separation allows
one to conceptualize how it might be that the subject is not doomed to
repeat the same structural position in relation to the Other indefinitely,
that is the problem of the interminable analysis. The realization of the
subject’s division would require something that is eventually irre-
ducible to repetition.
For Lacan the description of the formation of the subject hinges on
an argument for the conjunction of two lacks, that of the subject and
that of the Other. Their relationship is not properly described as sim-
ply dialectical or reciprocal. Lacan argues in ‘Position of the uncon-
scious’, with regard to the process of separation, that the subject finds
itself in the signifying chain at the interval between signifiers, imply-
ing that the alienation in the signifying chain is primary. Here the sub-
ject experiences ‘something that motivates him other than the effects
of meaning by which a discourse solicits him’ (Lacan, 1995[1964], 
p. 272). Lacan calls this an ‘encounter’ with the opacity of the Other’s
desire; emphasizing its radical priority to any signification or image of
desire. The subject responds to this lack in the Other by placing there
‘his own lack’; that is, the lack he would like to produce through his
own disappearance, a disappearance which has already been fore-
shadowed by the process of alienation but not given a form until, in
the process of separation, the subject disguises his own lack using the
lack of the Other. Such a conjunction of lacks forms a subject as a rela-
tion to the Other, as both the realm of desire and the means by which
he avoids desire’s subjective implications.
Although neurosis is not specifically mentioned in these passages, it
could be surmised that the neurotic’s impasse is that in response to
this opacity of the Other’s desire, the subject’s staging of his own dis-
appearance only substitutes the opacity of his own being as a subject
derived from the effect of alienation in the signifying chain. Being in
the realm of the signifier does not provide an answer to the encounter












































204 ANDREW J. LEWIS
involves the neurotic subject in a continual and anxious ricochet
between the Other’s desire and the subject’s own lack, which is the
typical clinical situation for a neurotic at the beginning of analysis.
This description of the process of separation can be readily applied
to the analytic situation. There are two temporalities at play in the ana-
lytic situation. The first is that described above, in which the analysand
operates according to alienation and separation, a kind of pulsation in
their attempt to resolve their own lack via the Other’s lack. (Lacan,
1995[1964], p. 267) In the second temporal moment we can locate the
analyst’s syncopated response. In effect, the moment when the ana-
lyst’s cut takes place is at the point just shy of the analysand’s attempt
to use the analyst’s lack as a cover of his own lack. Therefore, if the
analysis is to be successful, the analyst never quite fits the force of rep-
etition that operates, which is a disquieting experience for both parties.
An analysis introduces into the transference an Other that is not in a
reciprocal relation to the subject, nor in a position to give back to the
subject his own message in an inverted form. The analyst’s desire is
instead totally unable to be assimilated.
However, at this point Lacan adds a strenuous differentiation of the
temporality of the signifier from that of trauma and symptom forma-
tion: ‘Nachträglichkeit or deferred action, by which trauma becomes
involved in symptoms, reveals a temporal structure of a higher order’
(ibid., p. 268). This proposition amounts to a return to Freud in the
sense that Freud’s elaboration of deferred action was originally in
terms of trauma, which is by definition something excessive and
irreducible to a signifying effect. The premature experience of sexual
excitation is traumatic and, as such, logically precludes its entry 
into the signifying realm. Instead the traumatic component of sexual-
ity repeats. The repetition of what can only be described as the real 
is repeated precisely because it is not of the order of the signifier. 
As the etymology of the word trauma suggests, it leaves behind a trace
or wound, the marker of its having taken place or the imprint of its
having impinged upon the integrity of the subject. Such a sympto-
matic repetition of trauma cannot be assimilated to Lacan’s initial
model of repression as metaphoric, nor can the symptom be reduced
to an effect of meaning, so it is very interesting to see how, as these
aspects of symptom formation, trauma, and repetition begin to defy
his early enthusiasm for a purely structuralist account, Lacan begins
to mark out exactly how sexuality is implied in the unconscious, 
and how it is implicit in repetition, and thus how it arises in the trans-
ference.
The sexuality of the partial drives is neither of the structural order
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previously elaborated, but situated in between the two and thus sup-
posing the operation of both. The effects of signifying structure arise
via retroactivity and these effects of meaning derived from the uncon-
scious are actually a form of closure. On the other hand, desire and the
act of interpretation are futurally disposed. Yet at this point we also
have the time of sexuality that escapes both meaning effects and the
expression of desire. The real that is at the heart of repetition is both
continually repeated and always missed.
The occlusion produced by repetition accounts for the apparent het-
erogeneity and multiplicity of a subject’s relation to their sexuality and
also the commonly encountered alterity or excess of sexuality. This
explains the great clinical difficulty in moving towards the reduction
of this polymorphic perversity, and the foreign agent to the sexuality
which underlies it and which belongs indubitably to the singularity of
each subject. The function of sexuality in the transference indicates
Lacan’s Freudian commitment to an irreducible kernel of the real in
psychoanalysis situated at the level of human sexuality. The only dif-
ference is that Lacan would assert beyond Freud that the more radical
division is not that between conscious and unconscious but that
between the experience of jouissance and the subject who thinks.
CONCLUSION
We argued that the formation of the subject in the subject–Other rela-
tion requires the overlap of the subject and the Other’s lack, thus con-
stituting the subject’s desire as futurally disposed. The subject of the
unconscious is always arriving from the future and this is what brings
the subject into a transferential relation with the Other. In the section
on the temporality of trauma we argued, despite the orthodox
Lacanian view, that Lacan actually recognized that retroactivity is not
confined to a symbolic mechanism which produces meaning effects.
Rather, in a sense returning to Freud, retroactivity describes the man-
ner in which what cannot be represented is repeated: trauma is one
example and so too is sexuality. In the longest reaches of the logic of
repetition, and in the need to return to something unrepresentable that
lies within it, we have the expression of the most radical anteriority. It
took the genius of Freud to name the movement towards this point as
the death drive, the most radical point to which a subject seeks to
return. However, in choosing the seemingly misplaced term of death,
Freud alerts us to a kind of circulation, since this point is both one of
return to an anterior state as well as death, as the anticipatory and
inconceivable inevitability. This movement, silent within the transfer-












































206 ANDREW J. LEWIS
as the drive, which is also the fullest development of the mode of
sexuality. This push towards death is there in the transference.
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